the practical problem of life or to be a crutch on which you can lean'. This might appear at first glance to be contrary to my hypothesis, but moral philosophy cannot exist in a vacuum. It must examine real life problems and in this context be used to assist doctors both to be effective clinically and to take correct moral options.
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND CODES OF BEHAVIOUR
In order better to understand the application of moral reasoning to practical issues, I start with a summary of general ethical principles, doctrines and specific codes of behaviour, which teaching experience has shown to be essential learning, before proceeding to consider case examples. The Hippocratic Oath was probably written in the 5th century B.C. A doctor who takes the Oath swears above all to try to benefit his patient and especially not to harm him or her. He also swears never to divulge what he sees or hears in the course of his profession. The Declaration of Geneva is the modern restatement of the oath drawn up in 1947 by the World Medical Association and amended in 1973 and 1983. 4 Other specific codes of ethics soon followed which are listed and described in the BMA Handbook of medical ethics: Sydney in 1968 defined the criteria of brain death; Oslo in 1970 discussed the criteria for therapeutic abortion; Tokyo in 1975 adopted guidelines for doctors concerned with torture and punishment; and Lisbon in 1981 discussed patient rights and confidentiality. All these codes provide abundant guidelines on specific issues, but they do not resolve adequately the conflict between the claims of the individual and the wider requirements of society.
The general principles so important in applied ethics are as follows:-1. Beneficence. One should do good to the patient. This needs to be tempered by the next principle. 2. Non-maleficence (Primum non nocere). Above all, one should do no harm. This is more stringently enforced than the first principle. 3. Respect for the authority of the patient. A patient should be free to determine his own actions and give consent to the treatment offered. Essentially autonomy is the capacity of the patient to think, decide and act on the basis of such thought and decision, freely and independently and without 'let or hindrance'.5 The duty of beneficence or 'doing good' has to be moderated by the duty of respect for autonomy. 4 . Truth. The principle of telling the truth cannot be regarded as an absolute moral principle, but it is an ideal to be pursued to enhance trust and confidence. Ethical principles conflict at times in relation to truth-telling and it is sometimes necessary to deceive a patient for his own good. Generally speaking, however, deception conflicts with one's desires to preserve patient autonomy and a sound healthy relationship. fundamental paradox of health care is that medical advances so often breed further needs and increase further requirements for care. 7 The further life expectancy is extended, the greater becomes the pressure to allocate more resources to geriatric services. The ideal of trying to provide health care for all needs is laudable, but it is impossible for the Exchequer to meet all demands and some form of rationing of resources is inevitable. 7. Confidentiality. The principle of confidentiality between doctor and patient is venerated in the Hippocratic tradition. The nature of professional confidence varies according to the form of consultation or examination. The doctor is responsible to the patient for the security and confidentiality of the information given to him. Even after death a doctor must preserve secrecy on all he knows. THE MAJOR CATEGORIES OF ETHICAL THEORIES In America for some years past, persons concerned with ethical matters have plied their trade in hospitals and medical centres. Have they been doing anything useful, or what are they supposed to be doing? To answer these questions we come to examine and discuss the two major types of ethical theories. Deontological theories of ethics are based on the 'rights and duties' of persons (deon is the Greek word for duty).9 In this group the consequences of one's actions are not taken into account. Much theological dogma common to the great Christian religions expects absolute obedience to moral rules, for example, the Ten Commandments. The orthodox religious view is that all human beings are morally equivalent and have equal natural rights: a right to life, a right not to be killed, and a moral duty not to kill others. Others do not believe that people intrinsically possess absolute moral values and have inherent moral rights. These opposing views conflict in moral judgements of everyday events, so that sometimes what may appear on superficial examination to be utilitarian, may on closer inspection turn out to be absolutist, and vice versa. The great religions probably postulate that moral decision-making should often be taken out of the sole hands of doctors and clear guidelines should be laid down by the State having listened obediently to the spiritual and moral teaching authority of the Church on behalf of humanity. The second category of major ethical theory is that of utilitarianism.10 Put in its simplest Benthamite terms, it is about maximising happiness and pleasure and minimising misery, pain and suffering as a consequence of action taken. The theory was subsequently modified in the 1 9th Century by John Stuart Mill 8 to the moral concept of the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number'. It would be difficult to persuade people today that a human being's ability to feel pain and pleasure was the sole fundamental moral criterion by which to judge his actions. Mill ' extraordinary means' and morally optional depending upon the special circumstances of the patient and the wishes of his family. So 'extraordinary means' may be defined as treatment which involves a great burden for the patient and/or next-of-kin. There would be no moral distinction, however, between ordinary and extraordinary means if it was in the patient's best interests to be kept alive. Double effect. This doctrine is designed by theologians to ease moral decisionmaking in situations when intended good effects are likely to be nullified by unintended but foreseeable bad effects: for example, a doctor may administer medical treatment which is required to save the life of a pregnant woman even though this results in the death of the fetus, since the death of the fetus was not itself sought; a hysterectomy may have to be performed on a pregnant female who has an advanced cancer of the uterus.
APPLIED ETHICS
It is increasingly recognised that doctors cannot escape making a variety of ethical judgements in their practice. These vary from mundane practice decisions about accepting or rejecting difficult or unwelcome patients, perhaps unkempt, bedraggled and socially undesired by all, to issuing certificates against one's moral principles, to life and death issues. Students still receive insufficient formal education in ethical reasoning to help them prepare for such predicaments. It is just hoped and assumed that bedside teaching and scientific training will somehow equip them to make the right or the most professional decision without there being any clear idea of what 'right' or 'professional' means in this moral context. Terminal care of the dying patient is an area that illustrates well mutually exclusive ethical courses of action. It is taught formally in the fourth year of the Queen's medical curriculum by close collaboration between the Departments of General Practice, Geriatric Medicine, Mental Health and Oncology, with various health and social work professionals, ministers of religion, and doctors and nurses from the Northern Ireland Hospice. Telling the truth gently is more morally complex than appears at first sight. We try to make clear to students different and conflicting ethical positions, and discuss some mutually exclusive principles. These principles come into play in telling the truth to dying patients and may conflict if applied categorically. Two cases will illustrate the different moral dilemmas.
A 26-year-old doctor, Campbell Moreland Recently I was privileged to receive from a cleric a diary kept by a spouse in the practice, whose young husband had died. She had known for six months that the prognosis was hopeless but withheld discussion of the fact because her husband never seemed to consider that he was gravely ill and battled on bravely to meeting his daily commitments. He discovered the truth from his doctor only when close to death. He was quite shocked because he had always expected to recover. She wrote -'He has been ill many times, had suffered bravely and without complaint, but he had always recovered'. She was torn with guilt and anguish that she had not told him sooner, but was afraid that by doing so she would have undermined his confidence or shortened his life. In 1986 the last DHSS Guidelines were issued spelling out 'exceptionally, in cases where persuasion to tell the parents fails, the doctor should be free to prescribe without parental knowledge'. There the matter rests for the time being, but let me remind you of the BMA's five exceptions to the principle of not breaching confidentiality (BMA Handbook of medical ethics) :4 (1) when the patient gives consent; (2) when it is undesirable on medical grounds to seek a patient's consent, but it is in the patient's own interest that confidentiality should be broken; (3) when the doctor's duty to society overrides the principle; (4) when required for the purposes of medical research; (5) when required by due legal process. Secrecy is ultimately destructive of honesty and trust. Yet if the GP had informed the girl's parents without her consent, there would have been a family crisis. It is sometimes well-nigh impossible to choose a course of action which meets the teenager's health needs and at the same time does not violate the doctor's honest relationship with her parents. Underlying the Gillick arguments is the question of who should decide for the young. Lord Scarman revealed that the decision to override parental rights and responsibilities was not entirely a question of a doctor's discretion. He warned that a doctor must exercise his judgement properly, otherwise there could be possible criminal consequences, if he went outside the exceptional circumstances already defined by the Law Lords. Parents should normally decide, but how can they exercise this responsibility if they are in a state of ignorance of their child's sexual behaviour. In these circumstances it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a doctor who knows the parents is the person to exercise this responsibility, because he is the one to whom the girl has gone for medical advice. In conclusion, I have made explicit the relevance of medical ethics to clinical practice and offered a practical method of applying general ethical principles and moral doctrines to solve medical moral dilemmas. Your reaction and response will settle whether or not I was wise to choose such an abstract yet important topic in the wake of the I.M.E. Report. I found it a daunting task, conscious that doctors do not like theoretical lectures on moral philosophy. I will blame the choice on the vagaries of a professor of general practice, a peculiar hybrid by any standards. Universities and general practice are very different in structure and function. The former are intellectual and increasingly research-orientated, the latter is more intuitive and pragmatic. If I have managed to overcome to some degree the difficulties of my academic post it is in no small measure due to the enormous support of my colleagues in hospital and general practice, and the staff in the Department itself. Medical ethics is a vital aspect of medical practice. To summarise the theme of this address I quote Longfellow, 'Morality without religion is an empty shell, a kind of dead reckoning, an endeavour to find our place on a cloudy sea'.
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